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THE LAW OF NATURE IN STATE AND FED-
ERAL JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The notion that there is a law higher and better and more in
accord with justice than positive law we are told has paralleled
the existence of the law itself.' An appeal to reason or to the
sense of mankind as to what is just and right and the insistence
upon what ought to be law as binding because of its intrinsic
reasonableness, are declared to be among the strongest liberalizing
forces in legal history.2  This appeal to reason which commonly
goes under the designation-the law of nature or law of reason-
has had an eventful history since the formulation of the notion
by the Greeks and the Romans.
Natural law, a law to which legislation may or may not con-
form, is a conception which is constantly taking new form. It
may be described as the recurrence in the evolution of justice of
ideas of right in accordance with reason, ideas which are fre-
quently regarded as superior to positive law. The concept is one
which is often held to belong more properly to ethics, to
philosophy or to politics; but current usage, particularly in
continental European countries, terms it law.
3
1 Berolzheimer, The World's Legal Philosophies (Trans. by Rachel
Szold Jastrow), Int., p. XII. "It is an ancient, never-ending dream of
mankind that there is a peculiar, rigid and unchangeable law. This law
is thought to be a law of reason. What is agreeable to the reason is
supposed on. that account to be law, and necessary for all times and
places." Windscheid, Rectoral Address, p. 7, quoted in Gareis, Introduc-
tion to the Science of Law (Trans. by A. Kocourek), p. I9. See also
Del Vecchio, Formal Bases of Law (Trans. by John Lisle), pp. 324-335
on "Natural Law as the Goal of Historical Development."
Pound, Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 Harvard
Law Review, 6o8.
'Ahrens, Cours de droit naturel ou de philosophe du droit, gives a
brief survey of the growth of the natural law concept. Natural law or
the philosophy of law is defined as "the science which presents the first
principles of right discovered by reason and founded in the nature of
man." 8th ed., p. 1. Consult also Bergbohm, Jurisprudenz und Rechts-
philosophie, Vol. I, Part I, "Das Naturrecht der Gegenwart"; Jellinek,
Allegemeine Staatslehre, pp. 314-323; Stammler, Wirthschaft und Recht,
pp. I69-I88 (the latter denies the existence of natural law); Charmont,
La renaissance du droit naturel.
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That there is "besides the reason which guides us in fixing
the letter of the law, a larger reason which informs the spirit of
the law" and which is in last resort the ultimate justification for
the law itself is a pervasive principle the significance of which
has not at times been fully appreciated. Natural law, defined by
Grotius, "right reason as it guides men in the ultimate determina-
tion of right and wrong," is today as it has been in the past one
of the important concepts in the realms of law, government
and ethics. In the judicial decisions of the United States are to
be found some notable applications of this concept, a survey of
which is the purpose of this article. To understand and to better
appreciate the modem use of the doctrine it is necessary to give a
short account of the significant steps in the development of this
far-reaching legal principle.
The Law of Nature in Ancient and Mediaeval Times. The
historical setting of the law of nature cannot be presented within
the compass of a brief article. Moreover, the subject has been
adequately treated in recent legal literature- and for the present
purpose a brief summary of some significant historical facts will
suffice. The idea of a law of nature-permanent and universal
on which law is based-was familiar to the Greeks, particularly
Aristotle and Demosthenes. The Greek concept developed under
Stoic influence into the guiding principle of reason which was
held to be immanent in the universe and of which natural law
was an expression. Among the philosophers Cicero was the great
advocate of the Stoic philosophy of natural law. But of greater
importance is the .fact that the idea gained acceptance and
received the approval of the jurists Paul and Gaius, and through
them it was embodied among the principles of the great Corpus
Juris.6 This law was regarded as the substance of the precepts
4Salmond, The Law of Nature, ii Law Q. Rev. 121; Pollock, Expan-
sion of the Common Law, and Journal of the Society of Comparative
Legislation, Vol. II, i9oo; Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence,
Vol. II, Essay, The Law of Nature. See also references on preceding
page.
Salmond, op. cit., pp. 123, ff. Cf. Rhet. I, Io and 13, wherein Aristotle
refers to law that is universal "which is conformable merely to dictates
of nature"; cf. Ahrens, Philosophie du droit dans l'antiquit6, p. 296.
'Wardship is characterized by Gaius as an institution based on natural
reason and a similar basis for leases is suggested by Paul. Cf. Gains I,
i89. Inst. i, 2o, 6. Phrases referring to the law of nature and of reason
in Roman Law are:
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approved by "the common sense of all nations as embodying what
was practically useful and convenient."
'7
In the Middle Ages the law of nature and of reason which held
such an important place in the Stoic philosophy of the later
Roman Empire was gradually absorbed by the church and was
eventually given definite and specific application in the canon law
courts. To secure additional sanction from Aristotle, Cicero and
Justinian for the civil jurisdiction of the clergy, it became advan-
tageous to identify the law of nature with the law of God and
to apply the principle in the application of law to concrete cases.
Natural law came to be regarded as law in its fullest sense; it
possessed the same imperative elements as legislative enactments.'
The law of nature came to be differentiated from ordinary stat-
utes. All sovereigns were subject to this natural law which set
limitations "to the exercise of every kind of human authority and
the enactment of all positive law."9
In the hands of Grotius and his successors the law of nature
took the form of a rather well-defined code relative to such mat-
ters as reverence for God, family virtues, love of country, and
the rights of liberty and property. Natural law in its pure form
was to Grotius equivalent to the dictates of right reason, and as
such, absolutely immutable, subject to change not even by God
ius commune omnium hominum-Gaius Inst. I, i; Dif. i. 1, 9.
ius quod naturalis ratio constituit-Gaius Inst. i, i; also the famous
phrase-aequum et bonum, aequitas; cited among others in the
essay by Bryce, op. cit., p. 578.
TBryce, Essay on The Law of Nature, p. 578; Pollock, The History
of the Law of Nature, Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation,
Vol. II, 19oo; Salmond, pp. 128, ff. Gareis, Introduction to the Science
of Law, p. 18. Cf. my volume, The American Doctrine of Judicial
Supremacy, pp. i8, ff. and 289. A portion of the historical part of this
article follows with certain modifications the account given in the above
volume.
8Dunning, Political Theories, Ancient and Mediaeval, p. 211; Bryce,
P. 597; Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harvard Law Review,
39o; an able advocate of the "lex naturalis" was Thomas Aquinas, see
Berolzheimer, op. cit., p. 98; "A civil statute that contravenes natural
justice," affirms the mediaeval jurist Suarez, "is ipso facto void, for in
the hierarchy of the laws the precepts of nature are higher both in
source and in effect than those of any merely human power," Suarez,
III, xii, 4; also Salmond, 131, ff.
"Dunning, Political Theories, Ancient and Mediaeval, p. 281; Ahrens,
Sec. 41, p. 308.
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himself.' 0 The law of nature by its very definition was a rule of
life discoverable by human reason apart from any special revela-
tion or the decision of any particular authority. Often it was
equivalent to "a pretty frank appeal to expediency."
11
Law of Nature in English Law. At an early day in England
the law merchant was declared to be "a part of the law of nature
and nations" and as such universal, and the king's judges in the
absence of other authority were accorded the privilege of a
"resort to the law of nature which is the ground of all laws. 1 2
Following the mediaeval practice it was announced in 1563 that the
law of nature rendered any custom or statute in conflict therewith
void. In the seventeenth century the Court of King's Bench held
that the law of nature was implied in "the law of the land" as
used in Magna Charta. 3 With the advent of the dogma of a
presocial state of nature and the possession by the individual of
natural rights of superior sanctity, the conception of a law of
nature acquired a new meaning. Locke, the apologist for revo-
lution in England, declared the law of nature to be "a deter-
mining body of rules for the conduct of men in their natural
condition," embodying such fundamental matters as the right to
life, liberty and property.'4 The law of nature was regarded as
an outgrowth of a state of nature which Locke used as a postulate
and which Rousseau rendered a popular concept of the eighteenth
century political philosophy.'15
"Ibid., p. 165; Grotius is credited with the conception of a "primitive
and natural jurisprudence founded on reason itself, the source of every
other jurisprudence," Miraglia, Comparative Legal Philosophy (Trans.
by John Lisle), p. 22; see also Berolzheimer, op. cit., p. 115; Salmond,
p. 135.
'That the philosophy of law and natural law were combined in ancient
and mediaeval times is the contention of Berolzheimer, World's Legal
Philosophies, p. 6; "In the Middle Ages, natural law protected the
nations against the caprice of princes and papal power, defended German
from Roman law, and upheld the demands of what was reasonable in
the face of what became historical," Kohler, Philosophy of Law (Trans.
by A. Albrecht), p. 6.
" McIlwain, High Court of Parliament, p. 72; Bryce, Essay, p. 6oo,
Pound, 21 Harvard Law Review, 391.
' Baggs Case, ii Coke, 99 a.
"Treatises of Government, II, sec. 87, p. 123.
" For a criticism of natural law as defined and used by Hobbes, Locke
and Rousseau, see Kohler, Philosophy of Law, p. 25; for comments on
natural law by Kant, cf. Salmond, pp. 136, 137.
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According to Sir Frederick Pollock, the real link between the
mediaeval doctrine of the law of niture and the principles of
the common law is the words "reason" and "reasonableness."
Owing to the common lawyers' contempt for the canon law it
became customary to speak of reason in preference to the law
of nature. Thus from the natural law of ancient and mediaeval
times he finds developed the reasonable man of English and
American law. It is particularly necessary to note that nature
and reason are practically interchangeable terms in the early
development of the law of nature and that the term nature on
account of its canon law association was gradually dropped and
reason was used in its place by the English lawyers. As a conse-
quence, reason, reasonableness or natural justice, outgrowths of
the law of nature, have been clearly recognized in English law
although the terminology used has tended to conceal the fact.'"
Some of the evidences of the influence of natural law in the
development of various branches of the modern law of England
are thus summarized by Pollock: 17
Through Grotius international law was based squarely on the
law of nature. The Grotian theory found acceptance in the
famous opinion of Lord Mansfield in which he characterized the
law of nations as "founded upon justice, equity, convenience, and
the reason of the thing confirmed by long usage." The principle
of Lord Mansfield was accepted by Blackstone who, in defining
the law merchant, refers to certain legal consequences arising
"from natural reason and the just construction of the law." The
whole modem doctrine of what we now call quasi-contract rests
on an application of principles derived from the law of nature.
The test of a reasonable man's conduct governs the modem
law of negligence in England and America. Since the Middle
Ages the law of nature, or of reason, has been "a principal or
influential factor in developing the following branches of juris-
prudence-equity, the law merchant, the law of nations, the gen-
eral application, within the sphere of municipal law, of the
principles of natural justice and reasonableness, and the body of
rules for the choice of law and jurisdiction, and the application
" Pollock, Journal of Society of Comp. Leg., 196o, p. 418.
" Expansion of the Common Law, Essay on The Law of Reason, pp.
io7, ff. Cf. the common law doctrine that courts are to mold statutes
"according to reason and convenience to the best use," Chitty's note to
i BI. Comm. 87.
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of foreign law, which sum up under the head of conflict of laws
or private international law."' 8
Natural justice, or the reason of the thing, which the common
law recognized and applied was a direct outgrowth of the law of
nature which the Romans identified with jus gentium and the
mediaeval canon lawyers adopted as being divine law revealed
through man's natural reason. The effect of reasonable practice,
commercial reason and common sense of mankind in their influ-
ence on modern law Pollock thinks can scarcely be estimated. It
is "hardly too much to say that it is the life of the modern
common law."'19
The law of nature as a basis for principles that are fundamental
and unalterable developed in the eighteenth century into the
familiar natural rights doctrine of English and French political
thought. The most familiar presentation of the natural law con-
cept is to be found in Blackstone's Commentaries, where the
sacredness of the higher law is presented as follows:
Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be sub-
ject to the laws of his Creator. . .. This will of his
maker is called the law of nature. . .. This law of
nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God
himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other.
It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all
times; no hfiman laws are of any validity, if contrary to
this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force
and all their authority, mediately and immediately, from
this original.
2 ,
To Blackstone the three absolute rights which proceed from the
law of nature are the right of personal security, the right of
personal liberty and the right of private property.21 Blackstone,
"Pollock, op. cit., p. 113.
"°For a different interpretation of the influence of natural law, consult
Kohler, Philosophy of Law, pp. 6, 25, 350, ff.; Salmond, p. 142.
Comm. I, pp. 41-43.
- "These therefore, were formerly either by inheritance or purchase,
the rights of all mankind; but, in most other countries of the world
being now more less debased and destroyed, they at present may be said
to remain in a peculiar and emphatical manner, the rights of the people
of England. And these may be reduced to three principal or primary
articles; the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty,
and the right of private property, because, as there is no other known
method of compulsion or abridging man's natural free will, but by an
infringement or diminution of one or other of these important rights,
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however, places these precepts in the realm of moral restraints
by admitting that no authority can prevent Parliament from
enacting laws contrary thereto.22  It remained for the courts of
the United States to give a definite legal sanctity to the doctrine
of natural rights.
II
LAW OF NATURE IN THE PUBLIC LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
The influence of the notion of an overruling law of nature is
apparent at an early period in the United States. Before the
revolutionary leaders had made the doctrine of natural rights
popular, George Mason in a Virginia case argued that "the laws
of nature are the laws of God; whose authority can be superseded
by no power on earth. A legislature must not obstruct our
obedience to him from whose punishment they cannot protect us.
All human constitutions which contradict his laws we are in con-
science bound to disobey."23  Bonham's Case24 and Calvin's
Case22 were cited as precedents for declaring acts contrary to
natural right and justice. Basing his judgment on this doctrine,
Magistrate Symonds of Connecticut said: "The fundamental
law which God and nature has given to the people cannot be
infringed .. . The right of property is such a fundamental
the preservation of these inviolate, may justly be said to include the
preservation of our civil communities in their largest and most extensive
sense ....
Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every
individual.
A man's limbs . . . are also the gift of the wise Creator . . . To
these therefore he has a natural inherent right.
The security of his reputation or good name from the arts of detrac-
tion and slander, are rights to which every man is entitled by reason
and natural justice.
The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of
property. The origin of private property is probably founded in nature."
Comm. I, pp. 129-138.
--Sir Frederick Pollock maintains that Blackstone used the natural
law doctrine merely to ornament the introductory chapters of his Com-
mentaries, cf. "History of the Law of Nature," i Columbia Law
Review, 31.




right."28  The case along with the precedents cited gives evidence
that the common law was regarded by the colonists as expressive
of the law of nature and the law of God.2 7  In fact the judges in
the colonies were impressed with the overruling authority of the
laws of God and natural laws which were regarded as the true
law, and temporal legislation was considered to be binding only
in so far as it was an expression of this law. "With such a view
of the nature of legal obligations," says Professor Reinsch, "it
does not seem strange that magistrates should look for the true
law in their own sense of right and justice, or, in the Puritan
colonies, in the word of God."1
28
It is a matter of common knowledge that natural law and
natural rights were among the dominant ideas of the leaders of
the American Revolution as well as the framers of our first con-
stitutions. James Otis, 29 Samuel Adams, John Adams,2 0 Thomas
Paine, Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson, with a host of
others, combined to render the natural rights notion popular.
According to the Declaration of Independence men are "endowed
with certain inalienable rights, among these are life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness.' Many of the revolutionary patriots
believed with Dickinson that liberties do not result from charters;
charters rather are in the nature of declarations of pre-existing
rights. They are founded, according to John Adams, "in the
frame of human nature, rooted in the constitution of the intel-
lectual and moral world." Most significant of all is the fact that
constitutions, federal and state, were framed when the natural
rights philosophy was particularly prevalent. In bills of rights,
in occasional phrases in the body of constitutions and in the gen-
eral opinion regarding the nature of constitutions are to be found
evidences of natural rights, such, for example, as are expressed
in the New Hampshire constitution that, "all men have certain
natural,, essential, and inherent rights; among which are-the
'Giddings v. Brown; Reinsch, "Colonial Common Law," Select
Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Vol. I, p. 376; see also refer-
ence by Patrick Henry to the law of nature as superior to ordinary law,
Elliott's Debates, Vol. 3, PP. 139-140.
21Ibid., p. 377.
'Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Vol. I, p. 413; The
American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy, pp. 20, ff.
"See Quincy's Reports (Mass.) 474, where )an act against natural
equity is declared to be void.
'Quincy's Reports, 200.
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enjoying and defending of life and liberty-acquiring, possessing
and protecting property-and in a word, of seeking and obtaining
happiness." 31 It was pretty generally thought that governments
were instituted primarily to.render more secure these pre-existing
rights.
32
Although the prevalence of natural rights, based upon a funda-
mental and immutable natural law, in the colonial and revolu-
tionary periods is usually conceded, it is customary to assert that
the doctrine of natural rights and natural law has had little accept-
ance as a basis for judicial decisions in the public law of the
United States.
It is the practice to insist that while references to these phrases
are somewhat frequent the utterances are almost invariably in the
form of dicta, the decision resting on other grounds, and involv-
ing specific provisions of the written constitution. Some writers,
evidently misled by the differences in terminology in Anglo-
American and continental European countries and unaware of
the significance of judicial decisions along this line, have even
asserted that there is no such thing as law of nature or law of
reason in American law except in some obiter opinions. While
there is some merit in this contention and while the courts have
seldom openly and avowedly used natural law notions or the
doctrine of general principles of justice as the sole basis of a
decision to invalidate legislation, it can be readily shown that the
popular theory as to the lack of the influence and importance of
natural law in the constitutional law of the United States does
not give due consideration to the prevalence of this idea in judicial
decisions. By a citation of cases, federal and state, attention will
be called to the tendency to use natural law principles as a direct
basis to invalidate legislation and also as an implied ground to
broaden and render more effective the specific language of written
constitutions in the development of judicial review of legislation.
Natural Law as a Basis for Extra-Constitutional Limitations
upon the Power of Legislation. Whether there are limitations
on legislation other than those definitely and expressly outlined in
constitutions is one of the moot questions of American constitu-
tional law. According to one view there are no such limitations,
the courts have no authority whatever to interpose additional
restrictions to those defined in the constitution and the opinions
'Bill of Rights, Sec. 1 (784).
Cf. Merriam, American Political Theories, pp. 48, 49.
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favoring such a procedure are held to be in the nature of dicta
and in no sense the basis for judicial judgments. From another
viewpoint the very nature of free government requires such
additional limitations, the general principles of justice demand
them and governments were constituted in the United States with
these fundamental limitations clearly understood and appreciated.
Courts in applying these general principles of justice and liberty,
it is contended, are performing the most sacred function allotted
to them under free governments as conceived and developed on
this continent. Each of these rather divergent views has earnest
and able advocates. Each has received judicial sanction in
numerous cases. In an effort to deal with the advocacy of extra-
constitutional limitations there is no disposition to underestimate
the significance or to ignore the potency of the opposite doctrine.
A court cannot declare a statute unconstitutional and void, says
Judge Cooley, "solely on the ground of unjust and oppressive
provisions, or because it is supposed to violate the natural, social
or political rights of the citizen unless it can be shown that such
injustice is prohibited or such rights guaranteed or protected by
the constitution."'2 3  He admits that there are cases in which
judges have intimated a different doctrine but rather by way of
argument, he maintains, than with the object of setting limits to
the extent of legislative power not imposed by the constitution.
After the examination of some of the supposed extra-judicial
opinions the conclusion is reached that "the rule of law upon this
subject appears to be, that except where the constitution has
imposed limits upon the legislative power, it must b6 considered
as practically absolute, whether it operate according to natural
justice or not in any particular case."3 4  A long list of citations
is given in support of the contention that courts will not interpose
objections to legislation because it is unwise or oppressive, that
they will not interfere with the lawmaking power in the deter-
mination of matters of right, reason and expediency.
3 5 Similarly,
it is denied that courts may declare statutes void because they
are thought to violate fundamental principles of republican gov-
ernment, or are opposed to the spirit supposed to pervade the con-
stitution.2 Citations supporting this position can be extended
' Constitutional Limitations, p. 197.
" Ibid., pp. 2oo, 2Ol.
' See p. 2O, for citations to substantiate this conclusion.
" Cooley, pp. 202-2o4, for discussion and citations. See also I Kent
Comm. (12 ed.), p. 447; "if there be no constitutional objection to a
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indefinitely. 7  To quote the language of the Supreme Court in a
recent decision, "under the guise of interpreting the constitution
we must take care that we do not import into the discussion our
own personal views of what would be wise, just and fitting rules
of government to be adopted by a free people and confound them
with constitutional limitations. 3 8
The doctrine that there are extra-constitutional limitations and
that the courts apply principles of reason, justice or fundamental
principles of free government cannot be disposed of by simply
characterizing the opinions thereupon as dicta. A notion of
fundamental and inalienable rights which antedate government
and condition its very existence is one of the pervasive ideas of
American constitutional law. References to inherent limitations
upon every form of law making and to restrictions upon legisla-
tures along the line of fundamental rights are made frequently by
justices under circumstances and conditions which render it
impossible to dispose of their opinions as obiter or to rule them
out entirely as not one of the controlling grounds for the
decisions.
Even Judge Cooley, who states so positively the theory of legis-
lative supremacy within the limits defined by the constitution,
qualifies this theory in a marked degree by admitting the principle
of extra-constitutional limitations. "It does not follow, how-
ever," he remarks, "that in every case the courts, before they
can set aside a law as invalid, must be able to find in the constitu-
statute, it is with us as absolute and uncontrollable as laws flowing from
the sovereign power under any other form of government." i Comm.
141. Cf. also, Thayer, Legal Essays, for the opinion--"It may be
remarked here that the doctrine of declaring legislative acts void as
being contrary to the constitution, was probably helped into existence by
a theory which found some favor among our ancestors at the time of
the revolution, that courts might disregard such acts if they were con-
trary to the fundamental maxims of morality, or, as it was phrased, to
the law of nature. Such a doctrine was thought to have been asserted
by English writers, and even by judges at times, but was never acted on.
It has been repeated here, as a matter of speculation, by our earlier
judges, and occasionally by later ones; but in no case within my knowl-
edge has it ever been enforced where it was the single and necessary
ground of the decision, nor can it be, unless as a revolutionary measure,"
pp. 6, 7.
" For a list of Supreme Court cases and other citations, cf., R. P.
Reeder, Constitutional and Extra-Constitutional Restraints, 6i University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, 446.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, io6, io7 (i9o8).
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tion some specific inhibitions on legislative power." He cites as
illustrations of such limitations :-(I) a legislature can only exer-
cise legislative power; (2) taxation cannot be arbitrary nor for
any but a public purpose; (3) the right of self government, an
inseparable incident to republican government, cannot be taken
away; (4) passing one man's property over to another would of
course be void. The maxims of Magna Charta and the common
law are held to be interpreters of constitutional grants of power,
and such acts as are forbidden by these maxims are not to be
regarded as within the grant to the various departments of
government0 9
The extent to which the theory of extra-constitutional limita-
tions inheres as a determining factor in the development of con-
stitutional law in the United States and the various ways by which
the theory exerts an influence in particular judicial opinions and
in the development of entire branches of constitutional law can
best be shown in a survey of decisions. Some general statements
of the natural law doctrine will first be presented and then atten-
tion will be directed to the application of the doctrine as one of
the concrete rules in determining cases.
Opinions Favoring the Doctrine of Natural Law as a Basis for
Extra-Constitutional Limitations. Some of the earliest and most
notable opinions are known to have been in the nature of dicta.
A few at least of these opinions are worthy of citation since the
dicta were later accepted as the statement of a fundamental con-
stitutional tenet. Only a few instances can be referred to here;
other illustrations will be noted under the special limitations
imposed as an outgrowth of natural law notions. As far as pos-
sible those cases which are regarded as representative precedents
have been selected among the numerous opinions referring to
natural law.
Justice Chase believed that there are principles in our free
republican governments which will determine and overrule an
apparent and flagrant abuse of positive law. An act of the legis-
lature contrary to the first principles of the social compact cannot,
he thinks, be considered a rightful exercise of legislative author-
ity.40 A law that punishes a citizen for an innocent action and
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 206-8; like Blackstone and some of
his successors Cooley appears to be on both sides of the natural law
controversy.
I Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas, 388 (798); Justice Iredell regards the
reference to general principles as unnecessary and gives his opinion as
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one that makes a man judge in his own cause were cited as
examples of legislative acts prohibited by the genius, the nature,
and the spirit of our state governments and by the general prin-
ciples of law and reason.41  Chief Justice Marshall in the famous
case of Fletcher v. Peck, involving an interference by a state
legislative act with vested property rights, said:
"It may well be doubted whether the nature of society
and of government does not prescribe some limits to the
legislative power; and if any be prescribed, where are
they to be found, if the property of an individual,
fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without
compensation ?-42
The general principle that rights vested under a contract are
beyond legislative attack is strongly affirmed but the decision is
placed directly upon the provision of the constitution denying to
the states the right to impair the obligation of contracts.
As an advocate of extra-constitutional restraints Chancellor
Kent maintained that such rules of construction must be followed
as are agreeable to those settled rules which the wisdom of the
common law has established for the interpretation of statutes, and
are not inconvenient, nor against reason, and injure no person.
A statute is never to be construed against the plain and obvious
dictates of reason. The common law, says Lord Coke, adjudgeth
a statute so far void; and upon this principle the Supreme Court
of South Carolina proceeded; when it held that the courts were
bound to give such a construction to a statute as was consistent
with justice, though contrary to the letter of it. . . . It is not
intended that we have any express constitutional provision on the
subject; nor have we any for numerous other rights dear alike to
freedom and to justice. A law impairing previously acquired
rights was cited as equally to be condemned as those expressly
prohibited.43  The authority of common sense and reason of
favorable to legislative omnipotence except so far as specific restrictions
are defined in the constitution, pp. 398, ff.
I Ibid., 388.
'Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 135 (181o). See also, Terrett v.
Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 50 (1815), for reference by Justice Story to the
sacredness of vested rights of property as a principle "consonant with
the common sense of mankind and the maxims of eternal justice" and
the opposite doctrine as "utterly inconsistent with a great and funda-
mental principle of republican government."
'Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 5o2, 5o5 (i8ir).
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civilized states was in his opinion regarded as sufficient to cause
"not only the judicial, but even the legislative authority to bow
with reverence to such a sanction."" In a subsequent case,
45
Kent decided that as a principle of natural equity compensation
was due the owner of property taken by the state even in the
absence of any constitutional provision to that effect and that the
power of eminent domain could be exercised for public purposes
only. According to his view the police power was surrounded by
the same limitations.
46
In Wilkinson v. Leland, Webster and Story strongly supported
the notion of extra-constitutional protection to vested rights. "If
at this period," said Webster, "there is not a general restraint
on legislatures, in favor of private rights, there is an end to
private property. Though there may be no prohibition in the con-
stitution, the legislature is restrained from committing flagrant
acts, from acts subverting the great principles of republican lib-
erty, and of the social compact, " 47 and Justice Story, agreeing
with Webster, in the course of his opinion observed:
"The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to
require, that the rights of personal liberty and private
property should be held sacred. At least no court of jus-
tice in this country would be warranted in assuming, that
the power to violate and disregard them-a power so
repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil
liberty,--lurked under any general grant of legislative
authority or ought to be implied from any general
expressions of the will of the people.1
4
Not a few of the justices of the state supreme courts assert
similar views. The Court of South Carolina thinks it is clear,
"that statutes passed against the plain and obvious principles of
common right and common reason are absolutely null and void."
We are bound to give such a construction to the act "as will be
consistent with justice and the dictates of natural reason, though
contrary to the strict letter of the law."
49 In Virginia, where the
natural rights philosophy was prevalent, Justice Wythe main-
"Ibid., p. 5o8.
"Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. 162 (1816).
02 Comm., pp. 328-330; Corwin, Due Process of Law before the
Civil War, 24 Harvard Law Review, 375.
'72 Peters, 627, 646 (1829).
Ibid., 657.
"Ham v. McClaws, i Bay 93, 98 (1789).
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tained that the authority of the legislature could not prevail
against the law of nature and of nations. Justice Ormond of
Alabama held that any act of the legislature which violates the
great principles of civil liberty or inherent rights of man is void.
No power is delegated to invade these great natural rights.51
That statutes contrary to the principles of natural justice are
void whether prohibited by the constitution or not is not infre-
quently declared by the courts both state and federal. "There
are," says the Supreme Court of Tennessee in affirming this doc-
trine, "eternal principles of justice which no government has a
right to disregard. It does not follow, therefore, because there
may be no restriction in the constitution prohibiting a particular
act of the legislature, that such act is therefore constitutional.
Some acts, although not expressly forbidden, may be against the
plain and obvious dictates of reason. The common law, says
Lord Coke (8 Co. i8 a.), adjudgeth a statute so far void." 2
While the theory of extra-constitutional limitations was devel-
oped in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, it was after
'Page v. Pendleton, Wythe, Ref. (Va.) 211, 215 (793).
" Ex parte Dorsey, 7 Porter 293, 377, ff. (0838); Justice Ormond
thought the act in question came within the section of the bill of rights
reserving to the people all powers not specifically granted to the govern-
ment; consequently he did not rest his opinion on the doctrine of natural
justice although his approval of the doctrine is evident. The natural
rights ground for the decision was condemned by Chief Justice Collier
who denied to the judiciary the right to declare an act of the legisla-
ture void unless it be "violative of the constitution or of some one of
its provisions."
'Bank of State v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599, 6o3 (1831). The decision is
based on the ground of the denial of equal operation of the laws and as
being contrary to the law of land provision of the constitution. Hosmer,
C. J., in Goshen v. Stonington, says, "with those judges who assert the
omnipotence of the legislature in all cases where the constitution has
not interposed an explicit restraint, I cannot agree." An infraction of
vested rights would be a violation of the social compact and within the
control of the judiciary. 4 Conn. 209, 225 (1822).
"The legislative power of this state extends to every proper object of
legislation, and is limited only by our constitutions and by the funda-
mental principles of all government and the inalienable rights of man-
kind." Richardson, C. J., in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, I N. H.
111, 114 (1817). See also, Benson v. Mayor, io Barb. 223, 244 (i85o),
wherein the court, in defense of vested rights, says: "Their rights, in
this respect, rest not merely upon the constitution but upon the great
principles of eternal justice which lie at the foundation of all free
government."
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the Civil War that there was something in the nature of a revival
of 'the earlier natural rights theory, particularly in the interpre-
tation of some of the general phrases relative to individual rights
in federal and state constitutions. A great defender of the theory
was Justice Field. He referred frequently to the natural and
inalienable rights which belong to all citizens and declared that
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended "to give practical effect
to the declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights, rights which are
the gift of the Creator, which the law does not confer but only
recognizes."53  The classic presentation of the theory of implied
limitations is that of Justice Field in Butchers' Union Co. v.
Crescent City Co., where he amplified his notions. Certain inher-
ent rights he claimed lie at the foundation of all action and by a
recognition of these alone can free institutions be maintained.
Among these rights are declared to be the pursuit of a lawful
avocation and the enjoyment of property. He continued:
"I cannot believe that what is termed in the Declaration
of Independence a God-given and an inalienable right can
be thus ruthlessly taken from the citizen, or that there can
be any abridgment of the right except by regulations alike
affecting all persons of the same age, sex, and condi-
tion. . .. The right to follow any of the common occu-
pations of life is an inalienable right; it was formulated
as such under the phrase 'pursuit of happiness' in the
Declaration of Independence. This right is a large ingre-
dient in the civil liberty of the citizen. To deny it to all
but a few famed individuals, by investing the latter with a
monopoly, is to invade one of the fundamental privileges
of the citizen, contrary not only to common right, but, as I
think, to express words of the constitition."
In support of this contention of Justice Field, Justice Brewer
claimed that the first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution
were enacted to protect those rights of person and property which
See especially the dissenting opinion in the Slaughter House Cases,
i6 Wall. 36, 105 (1872); also, Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 321
(i866), "The theory upon which our political institutions rests is, that
all men have certain inalienable rights-that among these are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness; and that in. the pursuit of happiness all
avocations, all honors, all positions, are alike open to every one, and that
in the protection of these rights all are equal before the law." "
III U. S. 746, 756, if. (1883). For the influence of this case in the
development of the constitutional concept of liberty of contract, cf.
Pound, Liberty of Contract, i8 Yale Law Journal, 454.
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by the Declaration of Independence were affirmed to be inalienable
rights."
The well known opinion of Justice Miller puts in even more
positive form the position of Justices Field and Brewer. "It
must be conceded that there are rights in every free government
beyond the control of the state. A government which recognized
no such rights, but held the lives, the liberty, and the property of
its citizens subject at all times to the absolute disposition and
unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of
power is, after all, but a despotism of the many-of the majority,
but none the less a despotism. . . . The theory of our govern-
ments, state and national, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited
power anywhere.""8  Such general statements were soon more
definitely formulated under the designation, fundamental rights,
a term which has an interesting development under the aegis of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 "There are," said Justice
Matthews of the Supreme Court, quoting with approval from the
Supreme Court of Mississippi, 5o Miss. 468, "Certain funda-
mental rights, which that system of jurisprudence, of which ours
is a derivative, has always recognized."5 8 The powers of legis-
latures are held to be limited by "those fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions."'58 The court later approved full control
over the procedure "subject only to the qualifications that such
'Monongahela Navigation Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312, 325 (18-2);
Justice Brewer quoted approvingly the doctrine of extra-constitutional
limitations but found it unnecessary to base his opinion on natural equity
or the affirmations of the Declaration of Independence.
'Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 662 (1874).
I "It may be admitted that the words due process of law as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment protect fundamental rights." Howard v.
Kentucky, 2oo U. S. 164, 173 (i9o6); also, Twining v. N. J., 211 U. S.
78, 102 (i9o8). In defining due process the court says: "It is sufficient
to say that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere
in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may
disregard." Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 389 (897).
'Hurtado v. California, io U. S. 516, 536 (1883).
'It re Keninler, 136 U. S. 436; 448 (1889). See also, Hagar Reclaina-
tion Dist. No. .o8, iii U. S. 701, 709 (1885), for reference to "Those
general principles established in our system of jurisprudence for the
security of private rights." West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258, 263 (1903).
The proceedings of state courts "must not work a denial of fundamental
rights or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal
Constitution."
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procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights or con-
flict with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Con-
stitution."60  That it is the business of the federal courts to
protect fundamental rights has been declared in numerous
decisions.6'
This series of opinions on extra-constitutional limitations may
well be concluded with a few recent pronouncements of state
courts. The Supreme Court of Kentucky through Chief Justice
Hines maintained that:
"An act of the legislature may be unconstitutional because
impliedly forbidden by the constitution, or because expressly
thereby forbidden. An act is, by implication, unconstitu-
tional when not legislative in nature; such as an act taking
the property of one citizen and giving it to another, or an
act making one judge in his own case. Such attempted
legislation is arbitrary and despotic, not in its nature legis-
lative, the legislative department of the government being
limited by its nature as the executive and judicial, their
respective powers being circumscribed by the rules of
Magna Charta and of the common law, constitutions not
generally undertaking to define the duties and power of
either of these branches of the government. When the
legislation is in terms forbidden, we need look no further
in order to declare it unconstitutional, but when it is not so
denounced, we have the more delicate task of inquiring as
to the nature and limit of legislative power."'62
A similar conclusion was reached in Commonwealth v. Perry,
when the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held a statute which
violated fundamental rights as unconstitutional and void even
though the enactment of it was not expressly forbidden. 3 That
the state has no right to invade the domain of private rights
reserved by the citizen in the formation of government is the
claim of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Among the rights
'Brown v. N. 1., 175 U. S. 172, 175 (1899); Cf. West v. Louisiana,
194 U. S. 258, 263 (193) ; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86,
lO7 (19o9); see also dissent of justice Harlan, Pollock v. Farners'
Loan and Trust Co., 158 U. S. 6oi, 674-5 (1894).
"For recent declarations see Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172,
175 (1899); Rogers v. Peck, 199 U. S. 425, 434 (1905); Ballard v.
Hunter, 2o4 U. S. 241, 262 (19o7) and Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S.
17.3, 177 (1909).
'Barbour v. Louisville Board of Trade, 82 Ky. 645, 648 (1884).
6 155 Mass. 117 (1871).
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reserved, in the opinion of the court, are the great natural rights
of the individual:-
"A right of privacy in matters purely private is therefore
derived from natural law. This idea is embraced in the
Roman's conception of justice, which 'was not simply the
external legality of acts, but the accord of external acts
with the precepts of the law prompted by internal impulse
and free volition.' It may be said to arise out of those
laws sometimes characterized as immutable, 'because they
are natural, and so just at all times, and in all places, that
no authority can either change or abolish them.'"
The liberty which the individual derives from natural law, and
which is recognized by municipal law, embraces far more, says
the court, than freedom from physical restraint. The term lib-
erty is deemed to embrace the right of a man to be free in the
enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed by
his creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for
the common welfare. . . . The right of one to use his faculties
in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his
livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade
or avocation."4
A few citations, some of which are in the nature of dicta, from
among thousands of court decisions would tend to give the
impression that natural law has a very slight influence on the
constitutional jurisprudence of the United States. Although the
courts, especially in the opinions of certain justices, are disposed
to invalidate statutes on the ground of natural justice, inalienable
right and reason, whether expressly prohibited by constitutions
or not, it is customary to claim that the statutes involved are
contrary both to natural law and to the constitution. judging
from the language used there is good reason to conclude that in
"Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 194-7
(x9o4); in addition to a violation of natural law the statute was also
held contrary to the provision of the state constitution requiring due
process of law. "The habit," says justice Brewer, "of xegarding the
legislature as inherently omnipotent and looking to see what express
restrictions the constitution has placed upon its action is dangerous, and
tends to error. Rather regarding first those essential truths, those
axioms of civil and political liberty upon which all free governments are
founded, and secondly those statements of principles in the Bills of
Rights upon which this governmental structure is reared, we may properly
then inquire what powers the words of the constitution, the terms of the
grant, convey." State v. Nemeha County, 7 Kan. 549, 555 (187).
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not a few cases natural law is given first weight in the decision
and that the act is held void primarily as contrary to natural
justice and secondarily because contrary to some general
provision of the constitution.
The opponents of natural law, however, give extraordinary
emphasis to the references to the constitution. They maintain
that there are few, if any, cases in which natural law is the sole
ground of the decision and that consequently the notion may be
discarded entirely from the realm of positive law. The answer
to this conclusion is that natural law, natural justice and reason
are seldom used as the sole basis for the decision chiefly because
constitutional sanction, always very desirable, if not absolutely
necessary, has been found in a broad interpretation of the phrases,
law of the land or due process, so as to inhibit acts regarded as
arbitrary and undesirable,65 or in the general reservation favor-
able to individual liberty in the bill of rights,6 or in the require-
ment that laws be reasonable or wholesome and not unjust,
oppressive and inconsistent with the fundamental principles of
free government,6 7 or in a version of the theory of separation
of powers, declared to be a part of the constitution, by which
statutes considered unjust or unreasonable are held to be not
legislative in nature.6 It is rather that natural law notions have
been brought under the specific language of the constitution by
judicial interpretation or by the expansion of certain phrases of
the written instrument than that the idea has been either ignored
or discarded. The process by which certain ideas involved in the
law of nature were judicially declared within the language of the
fundamental law constitutes an important step in the evolution of
the legal concept in the United States. It is this process which
renders natural law such an important principle in modern
constitutional law.
'See cases, pp.
Cf. Ex parte Dorsey, 7 Porter, 293.
'Massachusetts Constitution, 178o; New Hampshire, 1784; Maine,
i8ig; see also provisions in constitutions of Kentucky and Wyoming
to the effect "absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and
property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest
majority."
' Cf. Barbour v. Louisville Board of 'Trade, 82 Ky. 645.
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III
What, then, are the fundamental and inalienable rights for the
preservation of which governments are declared to be instituted
among men? If these fundamental rights are no other than the
eighteenth century inalienable rights of Blackstone and the
Declaration a fairly good case is made for the recurrence of
natural law in recent judicial decisions.
According to Blackstone the absolute rights of individuals are:
(i) the right of personal security; (2) the right of personat
liberty; (3) the absolute right of property.6
9 Practically all of
the so-called fundamental rights are to be found under one of
these general classes but only certain specific applications of them
have been held to come within the implied inhibitions on legisla-
tive power. The majority of precedents involving the doctrine
of fundamental and inalienable rights are comprehended under:
(i) interference with property rights such as the taking of prop-
erty from one individual and giving it to another, or the taking
of property without just compensation; (2) interference with the
personal liberty, right of contract and pursuit of one's calling so
as to deny equal and impartial application of the law; (3) unfair-
ness or injustice in trial or court procedure, such as the rendering
of judgments without personal service.
70
In the early years of judicial review of legislation it was not
unusual to refer to the fundamental rights as being protected
by the law of nature, natural justice, the social compact or the
natural incidents of a free, republican government. In a few
instances the law of the land clause, which was considered as
applying primarily to judicial procedure and methods 
of tria 7 1
and consequently was given a rather narrow application, was used
as a basis to protect personal rights.
72  Gradually as occasions for
' See Kent's Comm. I, p. 587 (iith Ed.), where these rights are
declared to be "natural, inherent and inalienable."
"Cf. More v. State, 43 N. J. L. 203, 243, 244 (1881), wherein Justice
Van Syckel dissenting, claims that the rights for which immunity against
encroachments of the lawmaker outside of the express provisions of the
constitution can be claimed are confined to three instances, viz., the right
to private property, to notice and a hearing before judgment, and the
principle that a judge shall not be made a judge in his own case.
'McKechnie, Magna Carta, p. 441; Pike, Constitutional History of
the House of Lords, p. 169.
' That the law of land in Magna Carta was understood as a rather
broad guarantee against arbitrary power is the conclusion of McIlwaine,
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the exercise of judicial review increased and courts were disposed
to set more specific limits to legislative power the doctrine of
fundamental and inalienable rights was combined with the due
process clause. The combination was accomplished by defining
due process as an inhibition against laws either arbitrary or par-
tial in their operation and thus the rule of reason was given
constitutional sanction. By the addition of the phrase, equal
protection, in the Fourteenth Amendment the rule of reason
acquired additional force. As time went on due process and
equal protection were ordinarily referred to as the specific ground
for the protection of fundamental rights.73  A basis for their
application having been gradually discovered in constitutions by
broadening the scope of due process, it became unpopular with
lawyers and judges to refer to fundamental rights, natural law
and justice or to the general principles of republican government.
But fundamental rights remain about the same, whether used as
Due process of Law in Magna Carta, 14 Columbian Law Review, 28.
The interpretation of the provision by Coke was accepted and followed
in America. See 2 Haywood (N. C.) 29, 38, wherein Attorney-General
Haywood contended that the law of the land provision of the state
constitution was a declaration "not against a power they supposed their
own representatives might usurp but against oppression and usurpation
in general." Cf. also Mayo v. Wilson, i N. H. 58; Zylstra v. Corporation
of Charleston, i Bay (S. C.) 384 (1794) and especially North Carolina v.
Foy, 2 Haywood 31o (18o4). These and other early precedents are dis-
cussed in Corwin's The Doctrine of Due Process of Law before the
Civil War, 24 Harvard Law Review, 366, 46o.
On the development of due process and the absorption of natural law
and natural rights under this term and the doctrine of separation of
powers, see Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law before the
Civil War and The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law,
12 Michigan Law Review, 247. "It is no longer good form, because it
is no longer necessary, for a court to invoke natural rights and the social
compact in a constitutional decision. But the same result is achieved
by construing the very term by which legislative power is conferred
upon the legislature. Natural rights expelled from the front door of
the constitution are readmitted through the doctrine of the separation of
powers," p. 252. See also, The Evolution of Due Process of Law in
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, by F. W. Bird, 13 Colum-
bian Law Review, 37-50, for a discussion of the expansion of due process
to include the former idea of fundamental rights; also Hand, Due
Process of Law and the Eight Hour Day, 21 Harvard Law Review, 495;
the Fourteenth Amendment, says justice Wraite of the Supreme Court,
"simply furnishes an additional guarantee against any encroachment by
the states upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as
a member of society." U. S. v. Craikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 554 (0875).
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an extra-constitutional doctrine to invalidate acts or whether read
into due process in order to give the decision a cloak of constitu-
tional sanction. It is noteworthy that courts continue to refer to
the doctrine of natural and inalienable rights long after due pro-
cess has been extended to cover all possible cases of legislative
power which might be considered by judges as arbitrary or
oppressive.
An accurate valuation of natural law in the judicial decisions
of the United States would involve an exhaustive treatment of
certain phases of vested rights, of due process and equal protec-
tion of the laws, of standards of reasonableness, of justice and
public purpose as well as of other implied limitations on legislative
power. Some representative citations merely can be given here
to show the development and continuance of natural law ideas as
a controlling or supplementary ground in the consideration of the
validity of legislative acts. Natural law will be briefly considered
both in connection with specific phrases of written constitutions
and as an independent basis for judicial review with respect to:
(i) protection to property and contract-vested rights; (2) an
inhibition against arbitrary power in government; (3) protec-
tion against arbitrary acts affecting individual liberty, freedom of
contract; (4) the application of the test of reasonableness to the
police power, to rate regulation, and to social and industrial
legislation in general.
i. Protection to Property and Contract-Vested Rights.
Soon after the federal government was established in the United
States Justice Patterson, starting a long line of opinions denying
to the legislature the right to interfere with vested property
rights, said: "It is inconsistent with the principles of reason,
justice, and moral rectitude; it is incompatible with the comfort,
peace and happiness of mankind; it is contrary to the principles
of social alliance, in every free government; and lastly, it is
contrary to both the letter and spirit of the constitution."74  Soon
thereafter came the important judgment of the Supreme Court
of North Carolina that a contract cannot be dissolved even by a
legislative act because of a principle "incorporated into the
inevitable law of natural justice" which no power on earth can
overturn. The law of land provision of the constitution was
held to be a very definite restriction on the power of the legis-
" Vanhornes Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dallas, 304, 310 (1795).
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lature with respect to vested rights.
75 "When a law is in its.
nature a contract," said Marshall, "when absolute rights have
vested under that contract, a repeal of the law cannot divest those
rights. '76 A legislative act which attempted to interfere with the
property rights of a corporation acquired under previous laws is
invalid, said the Federal Supreme Court, the decision, according
to justice Story, "standing upon the principles of natural justice,
upon the fundamental laws of every free government, upon the
spirit and letter of the Constitution of the United States.
'77 A
similar effort to interfere with the obligation of contract in the
state of Maryland was declared void with the observation that
independent of any express restriction in the constitutions of the
United States and of that state "there is a fundamental principle
of right and justice, inherent in the nature and spirit of the social
compact, (in this country at least) . . .. that rises above and
restrains and sets bounds to the power of legislation.
7 8
In declaring void a statute authorizing a private road to be laid
out over the lands of a person without his consent, Justice Bron-
son held, "the security of life, liberty and property, lies at the
foundation of the social compact; and to say that this grant of
legislative power includes the right to attack private property,
is equivalent to saying that the people have delegated to their
servants the power of defeating one of the great ends for which
the government was established."
79  According to another court,
no one can be deprived of a part or a whole of his property unless
the public good requires it.8
0 In determining whether a police
regulation for the preservation of health serves the public good,
the court was obliged to fall back on the doctrine of reasonable-
ness. When the question was asked what section of the constitu-
tion had been violated by the act in question, "It is answer enough
to say," Justice Peck replied, "that the act takes away from some
Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Foy, 2 Hay. 310
(18o4).
"Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 135 (I8Io).
I Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, 5, (1S8).
"8Md. Regents v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 408 (838).
74 Hill, 140, 145 (843). See Stuyvesant v. The Mayor, wherein the
court refers to "a fundamental principle of civilized society, that private
property shall not be taken even for public use without just compensation,"
7 Cow. 585, 6o6 (1827).
'Austins v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121, 126 (834-5).
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their vested rights and gives them to others; changes the nature
of obligations, and dispenses with the liabilities which all others in
similar situations would lie under.""'
The Supreme Court of New York denied to the legislature the
authority to affect certain rights "because it is beyond the scope
of legislative authority to destroy vested rights of property,"8' 2
and held invalid an act for the more effectual protection of the
property of married women for the reason that the people have
never delegated to the legislature the power to divest the vested
rights of property legally acquired by any citizen of the state, and
transfer them to .another, against the will of the owner. Says
Justice Mason,
"I maintain, therefore, that the security of the citizen
against such arbitrary legislation rests upon the broader
and more solid ground of natural rights and is not wholly
dependent upon these negatives upon the legislative power
contained in the constitution . . . . the exercise of such
a power is incompatible with the nature and object of all
government, and is destructive of the great end and aim
for which government is instituted, and is subver-
sive of the fundamental principles upon which all free
governments are organized." '
The protection of property was early brought under the law
of the land provision of the constitution 4 and with the support
of the doctrine of natural and inalienable rights, it was eventually
formulated as a principle that "every individual has a right, under
the constitution, to be protected in the enjoyment of his property,
and no one can be wholly and entirely deprived of it by having
it taken from him and transferred to another, without compensa-
tion or benefit in any way by a special act of legislation."8' 5 That
vested rights of property are protected both on the theory of
Officer v. Young, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 320, 322 (1833).
'Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295, 300 (1848). See the earlier case of
Gardner v. Newburgh, in which it is claimed that in the absence of a
constitutional provision compensation is due the owner of property taken
by the state. 2 Johns. 162, 165 (i816).
White v. White, 5 Barb. 474 (1849).
s, See Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Foy, 2 Hay. 31o
(804).
'Sohier v. The Massachusetts General Hospital, 3 Cush. 483, 493
(1849).
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inalienable rights and on the express provision of the constitution
was held by the courts of New York
8 and Massachusetts.8 7
Although vested rights after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment are considered as well within the protection of the
-language of the due process provisions of federal and state con-
stitutions and thus are construed as having constitutional protec-
tion it is not uncommon to find the continuance of references in
judicial opinions to natural and fundamental rights as a basis for
invalidating acts which interfere with vested rights. These
references are to be found in both federal and state decisions.
A few recent opinions of state courts affirming the continuance
of natural right as a basis for the protection of property illustrate
this practice. The right to transmit property by descent or by
will, says a Wisconsin court, is an inherent right protected by the
constitution, and though subject to reasonable regulation, cannot
be wholly taken away or substantially impaired by the legislature.
Our theory is that the people, in full possession of inalienable
rights, form the government to protect those rights.
"So clear does it seem to us from the historical point of
view that the right to take property by inheritance or will
has existed in some form among civilized nations from
the time when the memory of man runneth not to the con-
trary, and so conclusive seems the argument that these
rights are a part of the inherent rights which governments
under our conception are established to conserve, that we
feel entirely justified in rejecting the dictum so frequently
asserted by such a vast array of courts that these rights
are purely statutory and may be wholly taken away by the
legislature."""
"There are certain fundamental rights of every citizen," says
the Massachusetts Supreme Court, "which are recognized in the
organic law of all our free American states. A statute which
violates any of these rights is unconstitutional and void, even
though the enactment of it is not expressly forbidden. . . . The
right to acquire, possess, and protect property includes the right
Wynhainer v. State of N. Y., 13 N. Y. 378 (1856) ; justice Hubbard
dissented, asserting that he was "opposed to the judiciary attempting to
set bounds to legislative authority, or declaring a statute invalid upon
any fancrful theory of higher law or first principles of natural right out-
side of the constitution," p. 453.
" Denny v. Matton, 84 Mass. 361 (1861).
'Nunemacher, Trustee v. The State, 129 Wis. 190, 197-202.
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to make reasonable contracts, which shall be under the protection
of the law."'89 Both by the doctrine of inalienable rights and by
the constitution, vested rights of property and contract are thus
declared to be beyond legislative attack.
2. The Inhibition Against Arbitrary Power in Government.
The extension of due process so as to cover the former scope of
natural law was accomplished in part by including under this
phrase, among other things, an inhibition against laws of an arbi-
trary nature affecting either the individual rights of person or
property. justice Chase was one of the first judges to deny to
the legislature the right to pass arbitrary laws "contrary to the
first principles of the social compact." The somewhat extra-
judicial opinion of Chase found worthy defenders in the state
courts where it was held that the design of the government,
particularly of the due process clause, was "to exclude arbitrary
power from every branch of the government."9 0  That arbitrary
statutes are not the law of the land was affirmed by Justice John-
son in the notable comment: "as to the words from Magna
Charta, incorporated into the constitution of Maryland, after
volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the
good sense of mankind has at length settled down to this: That
they were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary
exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private right and distributive justice."'"
It remained for Justice Field to put this principle in such a form
that it could be brought directly under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and thereby rendered more effective as a legal check on
legislative power. In Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.,
he claims that police regulations may be upheld "when such
Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 125 (1891). See also, for
reference to inalienable rights, State v. Lynch, io2 N. E. 671. (J. Wana-
maker dissents and criticises judge-made restrictions on legislation.)
" See C. J. Gibson in Norman v. Heisk, 5 Watts and Serg. 171, 173
(1843); Officer v. Young, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 320 (1833); Westerfelt v.
Gregg, 12 N. Y. 2o2 (1854); Clark v. Mitchell, 64 Ma. 564 (1877);
Atchison v. N. Ry. Co v. Baty, 6 Neb. 37 (1877). According to Justice
Gantt, "This one great end of government is the protection of the
absolute right of individuals-the life, liberty, and property of each
citizen of the state." The statute in question is held to be "repugnant
to the fundamental principles in respect to individual rights, the limita-
tions and guarantees of the constitution and the maxims of the common
law," pP. 44, 47.
"Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheaton, 235, 244 (I819).
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regulations do not conflict with any constitutional inhibition or
natural right" and defines the purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a series of prohibitions "to prevent arbitrary invasion by
state authority of the rights of person and property, and to secure
to everyone the right to pursue his happiness, unrestrained except
by just, equal and impartial laws.19 2
The general adoption of an inhibition against legislation
regarded by the courts as arbitrary is sanctioned more recently
by the Federal Supreme Court, when it decided, relative to pro-
cedure in state courts, that due process is satisfied by "a trial in
a court of justice according to the modes of proceeding applicable
to such a case, secured by laws operating on all alike, and not
subjecting the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers
of government unrestrained by the established principles of
private right and distributive justice,"9 3 and that the Fourteenth
Amendment "legitimately operates to extend to the citizens and
residents of the states the same protection against arbitrary state
legislation affecting life, liberty and property as is offered by the
Fifth Amendment against similar legislation by Congress." 94
State regulations relative to the police power are held not to be
subject to federal interference "unless they are so utterly
unreasonable and extravagant in their nature and purpose that
the property and personal rights of the citizen are unnecessarily
and in a manner wholly arbitrary interfered with or destroyed
91 U. S. 746, 759 (1883). See also, Davidson v. New Orleans, 96
U. S. 97 (1877) and Monongahela B. Co. v. U. S., for a rather enlight-
ening confession "that the courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so
restrained by technical rules that they could not find some remedy, con-
sistent with the law, for acts, whether done by government or by indi-
vidual persons, that violated natural justice or were hostile to the funda-
mental principles devised for the protection of the essential rights of
property." 216 U. S. 177, 195 (199o).
'Justice Harlan in Chicago, Burlington & Ry. Co. v. Chicago, x66
U. S. 226, 234 (1896), approving a similar decision in U. S. v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U. S. 542-554.
"Justice Peckham in Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, 325 (19o3). Says
the court in a more recent case: "Consistently with the requirements of
due process no change in ancient procedure can be made which disregards
those fundamental principles to be ascertained from time to time by
judicial action which have relation to process of law and protect the
citizen in his private right and guard him against the arbitrary action of
government." Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 1Or (9o8).
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without due process of law. 05  While generally, says a New
York court, it is for the legislature to determine what laws are
required to protect and secure the public health, "under the mere
guise of police regulations it may not arbitrarily infringe upon
personal or property rights." ' The requirement of public pur-
pose in taxation is also an effort to prevent arbitrary legislative
action.9 7 Even broader ground as a basis for protection against
arbitrary statutes is suggested in the contention of courts that
only legislative power has been vested in the legislature and that
acts not considered within the scope of the general grant of power
are of necessity arbitrary and must be declared void. 8
3. Protection against arbitrary acts affecting individual liberty
and freedom of contract constitutes a further extension of the
natural law concept. When in 1886 a store order act of the state
of Pennsylvania was held to be utterly unconstitutional as an
arbitrary attempt to prevent persons from making their own con-
tracts9" a fruitful field was discovered for further limitations
on legislative power in accordance with the theory of inalienable
rights. With Justice Field's opinion supporting freedom of con-
tract and of calling' 0 and with a strong state precedent it was
not long until state courts, jealous of the encroadhments upon
individual rights in the realm of .social legislation, were led to
defend liberty of contract as a natural and inalienable right.
Says an Ohio court,
"Manifestly, of all the rights of persons, it is the mostsacred and most essential to the happiness of all mankind.
We do not believe that, in good conscience, the right to
make any lawful contract can be limited or controlled by
"Justice Peckham in Gundling v. City of Chicago, i77 U. S. 183, 188,(igoo). Acts are to be upheld, says Justice Harlan, "unless they areclearly inconsistent with some power granted to the general government,
or with some right secured by that instrument or unless they are purelyarbitrary in their nature." Chicago Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453, 465 (igio).
"In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 11o (1885).
' Loan Association v. Topeka, 2o Wall, 655 and Cole v. La Grange.
' y nhamer v. The People, 13 N. Y. 378, 385 (1856) ; State v. U. S.
and Canada Express Co., 6o N. H. 219, 235 (88o); also dissentingopinion of Justice Ranney, Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 6o7, 628 (1853)
and Justice Connor in Daniels v. Homer, 139 N. C. 219, 237 (19o5), and
Justice Walker, State v. Lewis, 142 N. C. 626, 645 (i9o6).
Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431 (1886).'"Butcher's Union v,. Crescent City Co., iii U. S. 746.
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legislation determined by no rule or principle, that is purely
arbitrary legislation, and therefore absolutely defenseless;
because if it could, the right of freedom of contract would
cease to live, and would become a mere plaything, and a
license revocable at the will, whim or caprice of the law-
making power; and therefore, the government would
become a despotism, both in theory and in fact. Despotic
power of this sort cannot live; for if it could, it would
be destructive of the sacred right to enjoy and defend life
and liberty, to acquire, possess and protect property, and
to seek and obtain happiness and safety, solemnly declared
to be inalienable by the Bill of Rights of the State of
Ohio.,' 1
Again, a statute was held to be an arbitrary interference 
with
liberty and property and not within the legitimate sphere 
of legis-
lation which released a city from paying for work performed
under a contract because the contractor failed to pay 
the pre-
scribed rate of wages to the workmen.
10 2 The protection of the
inalienable right of liberty of contract was taken up vigorously
by the state courts and much labor legislation was thereby
annulled;103 the protection in the Supreme Court culminated 
in
the decisions of Lochner v. New York,
104 Adair v. United
States' 5 and Coppage v. Kansas
10 and led to the affirmation of
the dictum of Justice Harlan that "the employer 
and the
employee have equality of right, and any legislation that 
disturbs
that equality is an arbitrary interference with the 
liberty of
contract, which no government can legally justify 
in a free
land.'01
' State v. Norton, 5 Ohio N. P. R. 183 (1898).
"'.People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, i66 N. Y. I, 15 (91oi). 
Parker,
Ch. J. (dissenting), "The reasoning by which the 
decision about to be
made is sought to be supported fails to persuade me 
that it is other than
a judicial encroachment upon legislative prerogative; 
for it is that and
nothing less if the statute does not offend against either 
the Federal or
the State Constitution," p. 25.
"For an excellent summary and discussion of cases 
consult Pound,
Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale Law Journal, 454.
104 198 U. S. 45 (904).
112o8 U. S. 161 (1907).
"0236 U. S. 1 (914).
'Adair v. U. S., 2o8 U. S. 16x, 175. For a suggestive 
discussion of
the development of liberty of contract as an outgrowth 
of natural law
notions in reviewing labor legislations, consult Pound, 
Liberty of Con-
tract, x8 Yale Law journal, 454.
THE LAW OF NATURE
In defining equal protection as well as due process it was
declared that the very nature of the law is opposed to all merely
arbitrary or capricious acts on the part of the state. Purely
arbitrary acts of the legislature directed against individuals or
classes of individuals are held not to conform to due process or
the requirement of equal protection of the laws.
108
"It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty
and natural justice," affirmed the Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts, "and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any
one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages, which are
denied to all others under like circumstances: or that any one
should be subjected to losses, damages, suits or actions, from
which all others under like circumstances are exempted."
109 In
rendering a judgment on a similar issue the Supreme Court of
Vermont held that there is no such thing as absolute despotic
power in our government.110  More recently Justice Talbot of
Nevada, in deciding that the business of banking is a lawful busi-
ness which it is the inherent right of every citizen to engage in,
holds that the legislature may regulate when regulation will pro-
tect. 1 Due process and equal protection are said to be secured
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment "if the laws
operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbi-
trary exercise of the powers of government.
1 1 2  It is only by the
exercise of a power to invalidate legislation under these general
restraints that courts are said to be enabled "to repel assaults
and protect every part of the government and every member of
" M Gehee, Due Process of Law, pp. 6o, 61.
' Holden v. James, ii Mass. 396, 4o3 (1814).
1 Ward v. Barnard, i Aikens I2O, 127, 128 (1825); 'for an interpreta-
tion of the "law of the land" as an inhibition against arbitrary acts, see,
Vanzant v. Waddell, 2 Yerg. 260, 270 (1831) and Wally's Heirs v.
Kennedy, 2 Yerg. 554; Bank of State v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599; Ex parte
Dorsey, 7 Porter 293 (1838); Barbour v. Louisville Board of Trade,
82 Ky. 645 (884).
"'Marynwount v. State Banking Board, 33 Nev. 333, 341 (1910).
' Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 662 (1892) ; for the affirmance of
liberty of contract as against legislative acts deemed by the courts as an
arbitrary invasion of individual rights, see Braceville Coal Co. v. People,
35 N. E. 62 (1893); Frorer v. The People, 141 Ill. 171 (1892); also,
Millet v. People, 117 Ill. 294 (1886); State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 317
(i&_y2). In this case, Justice Barclay dissents with the observation: "It
amounts in substance to a declaration that statutes which seem to the
court unjust or unreasonable are not 'due process of law' though not
otherwise distinctly forbidden by the constitution."
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the community from undue and destructive innovations upon
their charter :rights." 113
The cases which involve judgments of a court without service
or appearance in which natural law and justice is one of the
grounds of the decision are comparatively rare. A few of the
precedents, however, must be ranked foremost among the natural
law decisions. In Harris v. Hardeman, relative to the lack of
service either actual or constructive, the Supreme Court quoted
the state courts to the effect that the necessity of service "does
not depend merely upon adjudged cases. It has a better founda-
tion, it rests upon a principle of natural justice."114 "If to hold a
defendant bound by such a judgment (without service) is con-
trary to the first principles of justice" according to Justice Field
"it is difficult to see how the judgment can legitimately have any
force within the state."'" The individual rights of person and
property are accorded substantial protection through the inclusion
of inalienable rights in due process." 6
4. The Application of the Test of Reasonableness. One of
the last but not the least significant developments of natural law
is to be found in the application of the test of reasonableness to
legislative acts, particularly with respect to the police power, to
the regulation of corporate industry and public utilities. It has
been a time-honored practice of courts to test the ordinances and
by-laws of corporate bodies as well as the acts of subordinate
government units, such as cities and counties, on the basis of
reasonableness. The judiciary of the United States was prevailed
upon to introduce this test as a part of the doctrine of the judicial
review of legislation and to require the test of reasonableness for
legislative acts, particularly with respect to the police power and
to industrial legislation. Notice and hearing, the fundamental
conditions of due process, according to Professor Freund, would
be without value if it did not assure a just cause for proceeding
against the individual; the essence of due process then is just
cause, and this must underlie every act of legislation.
"' State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 187 (889).
"'Justice Daniel in 14 Howard 334, 341 (1852). See also, Scott v.
McNeal, 154 U. S. 34 (1893); and Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wendell 156
(183o).
... Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 732 (1877).
" Consult article by Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty"
in those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions which protect
"Life, Liberty and Property," 4 Harvard Law Review, 365.
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"The just cause of legislation," he maintains, "is the per-
formance of some legitimate function of government. It thus
becomes a requirement of the constitution that every statute
should be the exercise of some recognized power justified by the
reason and purpose of government." Each department of gov-
ernment has its inherent purpose or function based upon rules
and limitations that are above legislation. It is for the courts in
the United States to enforce these limitations. Professor Freund
continues:-
"There has never been a civilized government which has
not recognized, and practically acted upon, the existence
of limitations of the nature here indicated. For all gov-
ernments profess to apply or to make law, and the nature
of law implies the idea of restraint according to intelligible
principles of reason. The peculiarity of American juris-
prudence and government lies in the possibility of sub-
jecting legislation to judicial control with a view to
enforcing these principles and limitations. In one view of
the matter, it is still the government, and only a different
department of it, which conclusively determines whether
a given act is within the principle of reason or not. But
the great determination is withdrawn from a body accus-
tomed to follow considerations of expediency and interest,
and vested in organs which by virtue of their constitution,
methods of procedure, and traditions, are peculiarly
qualified and apt to give effect to the claims of reason and
justice.
' ' 117
One of the earliest applications of the test of reasonableness
with respect to the police power came in connection with regula-
tions interfering in an incidental way with property rights. For
the common good and general welfare courts were inclined to
hold that rights of property, like all other social and conventional
rights, were subjet to reasonable limitations as well as reason-
able restraints and regulations."" If enactments "are repugnant
"'Freund, Police Power, pp. 15, 16.
I Commonwealth v. Alger, 6i Mass. 84 (1857); also Westerfelt v.
Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202 (1854); Barbour v. Louisville Board of Trade,
82 Ky. 645 (1884); J. Pryor dissented on the ground that "when a
court of equity undertakes to deprive the legislature of the right to
exercise its discretion as to what constitutes the public welfare it is an
assumption of power that does not belong to the judicial tribunal of
the state," p. 666. Says Justice Gilchrist, "What is the power of a
state legislature' in those particulars in which it is not limited by the
constitution? Clearly it is supreme within its appropriate sphere. It
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to the natural sense of justice, subversive of the principles of
sound legislation, and conflict with a wholesome policy long estab-
lished and sanctioned by the tests of experience and common
consent" as well as when they transcend the limits of the legisla-
tive authority as defined by the constitution they are to be declared
null and void, says the Supreme Court of North Carolina."1
9
Every exercise of the police power it is held must be reason-
able ;120 whether it is a reasonable or an unreasonable iexercise of
legislative power over the subject matter involved is often a
matter of fact, and in many cases questions of degree are the
controlling ones.: 2' Although no express limitations on the
police power are to be found in the constitution of Ohio, says
Justice Davis, "such limitations as are recognized arise by con-
struction from the nature of the power itself and the declaration
of rights."'1 22  When the courts declare a statute void on the
ground that it is unreasonable, they necessarily assume the exist-
ence of a standard of reasonableness which is above legislative
polity.
12 3
It is impossible to go into the various ramifications of the appli-
cation of the reasonable test to legislation under the police
power.' 2 4  Not only is the reasonable test applied to regulations
may make all such laws as do not outrage the rights of person and
property, upon a proper regard to which civilized society depends so much
for its existence; and when we say that it cannot make a law thus
obnoxious, we mean rather that society could not exist if such laws were
passed, than that the constitution has in terms prohibited them." Concord
Ry. Co. v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47, 54 (1845).
'Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. (N. C.) I, 3 (1833).
.Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1885); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U. S. 537, 550 (1895).
I Cf. Wisconsin M. & P. Ry. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287 (9oo);
Freund, pp. 57, 6o.
'Mirick v. Sims, 79 Ohio St. 174, 178 (908).
' Freund, Police Power, p. 57: "The courts assume a general function
of supervision regarding the adjustment of means to ends in the pro-
tection of public interests. While they profess to regard the state
legislature as a co6rdinate power, they frankly treat the municipal
authorities as subordinate..... .As the power of judicial control over
statutory legislation is more and more distinctly assumed, and the theory
of the necessity of express limitations is abandoned, the adjudications
on ordinances will become more valuable as precedents to indicate the
measure of legislative power in the interest of health and safety." Freund,
p. 132.
u'See especially, Freund, Police Power; for application of the
test to protective legislation, see, Powell v. Peivna., 127 U. S. 678, 685
THE LAW OF NATURE
under the police power, but also to the regulation of public utility
rates12 and to the control of combinations and monopolies both
by common law and by recent decisions under the Sherman
Act,' 2q--an extensive and far reaching application of the test
to which only passing reference is possible here. "Practically,
the present system of judicial review means that the three depart-
ments of the government must be convinced of the justice and
reasonableness of a change in social or economic policy before it
can be enacted into law."'
1 27
The requirement of reasonableness as developed in connection
with the growth of due process and equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment must be regarded as one of the most
potent of the restrictions upon legislative activity imposed by
constitutions and the implied limitations of judicial cognizance.
28
While it cannot be claimed that the extension of the common law
doctrine of reasonableness is entirely a result from and an evolu-
tion of the mediaeval and eighteenth century idea of a law of
nature it can nevertheless be readily seen that the earlier concepts
of nature and reason form the basis and condition the development
of this branch of constitutional limitations.
(1887) ; Holden v. Hardy, t69 U. S. 366, 39I (1897) ; McLean v. Arkansas,
211 U. S. 539, 547 (i9o8); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. v.
McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 569 (igoo). Justice Hughes said: "The principle
involved in these decisions is that where the legislative action is arbitrary
and has no reasonable relation to a purpose which it is competent for
government to effect, the legislature transcends the limits of its power,"
p. 569.
"Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 20 Wall. 669
(1874). "There can be no doubt of the power and duty of the courts to
inquire whether a body of rates imposed by a legislature or a commission
is unjust and unreasonable, and such as to work a practical destruction
of riglits of property, and if found so to be, to restrain its operation."
Reagan v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362; Int. Cont. Comm.
v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 222 U. S. 541 (911).
"Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197 (1903); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 211 U. S. I (19o8) ; U. S. v. American Tobacco
Co., 211 U. S. 189. Cf. also, dissenting opinion of Justice White, U. S.
v. Freight Association, I66 U. S. 29o (1896) especially, p. 355.
"Freund, Police Power, p. 17.
'The influence of the law of reason in the development of equity and
international law as well as in other branches of the law cannot be con-
sidered in this article although the evolutipn of the concept of reason-
ableness along these lines is no less interesting or significant than in
those selected for treatment.
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,IV
Among the terms in rather common usage in judicial opinions
involving the application of natural law ideas are,-
just ........... unjust or discriminatory Natural law equality
appropriate .... inappropriate Natural reason uniformity
reasonable ..... unreasonable Natural justice common welfare





All of these terms, used as grounds for the determination of
the validity of statutes, are to a certain extent, at least, a develop-
ment from the ancient and mediaeval concepts, law of nature and
law of reason, and whether held to be a part of written constitu-
tions or independent of the fundamental law they involve the
use of the law of nature theory and philosophy in accord-
ance with the methods and terminology peculiar to modern
jurisprudence.
The disposition to deny the potency of the doctrine and to
relegate all opinions relative thereto to the comparatively insig-
nificant r6le of dicta fails to give due credit to the direct judg-
ments of courts based on this principle, to the numerous dissenting
opinions of judges recognizing the application of the principle
in the majority opinion and judgment and to the development of
due process and equal protection to include natural law and
reasonableness in broad and varied applications.1
29
The law of nature as applied in American courts has been
subjected to severe criticism. In the first place it is strenuously
insisted upon in many quarters that it is entirely beyond the
' A partial explanation of the lack of sympathy with and appreciation
of the influence of natural law may be accounted for in the impressions
of the composite traits of a typical court as described by Dean Wigmore.
(i) lack of acquaintance with legal science; (2) lack of acquaintance
with legal history; and (3) the philosophy and jurisprudence of the law
are unknown. The Qualities of Current Judicial Decisions, 9 Illinois Law
Review, 527. What is characteristic of a typical court in this regard is
even more characteristic of the average lawyer, and it may be presumed
that lawyers and judges who have neither acquaintance with nor apprecia-
tion of legal science, legal history, and legal philosophy would not be
likely to give much consideration to the law of nature.
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function of courts to deal with such a vague and indefinable con-
cept. Judges and lawyers who are guilty even of incidental
references to this idea are subjected to both ridicule and censure
by the strict letter advocates of constitutional interpretation. The
assumption that natural law is something absolute and unalterable
which was a characteristic of the Middle Ages and was prevalent
in the eighteenth century was followed by a theory of the historical
and analytical schools of jurisprudence in England and America
which aimed to recognize only positive law, thus attempting to
rule out natural law entirely. 130 These schools of jurisprudence
have encouraged the theory that the very idea of the law rendered
the notion of natural law impossible. They have fostered the
practice now so common among the practical men of bench and
bar to cast ridicule and scorn upon natural law as .well as upon
jurisprudence and what is commonly known on the continent as
the philosophy of law. But, as Sir Henry Maine demonstrated
some years ago,13' the common lawyers are disposed to maintain
a legal fiction although the practice contrary to the fiction is a
well recognized fact to the members of the profession. Thus it
is the vogue for the legal profession to deny the potency of nat-
ural law and natural rights at the same time that courts and
judges are making free use of such notions in their opinions and
judgments when on occasion it seems wise and appropriate.
A more recent charge is brought against the natural law adher-
ents. This charge is to the effect that through judicial decisions
an effort is made to enforce eighteenth century notions upon
existing law and that modern social and industrial legislation
must conform to an absolute and immutable standard of natural
right or be annulled. Says Dean Pound, "Eighteenth century
jurists conceived that certain principles were inherent in nature,
were necessary results of human nature, and that these principles
were discoverable a priori. They held that it was the business of
the jurist to discover these principles, and, when discovered, to
deduce a system therefrom and test all actual rules thereby.
Such is even now the orthodox method in our constitutional law.
Our bills of rights are regarded as merely declaratory of funda-
mental natural rights. Eminent judges assert that legislation is
to be judged by those rights and not by the constitutional texts
' Berolzheimer, World's Legal Philosophies, p. 6.
"Ancient Law, pp. 24, ff.
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in which they are declared. '132 It is claimed that the prevalence
of the eighteenth century notions of natural law have tended to
preserve the doctrine of laissez faire in government long after
industrial conditions have rendered that theory obsolete and to
foster an ultra individualism in an age when social conditions
and thought demand socialization of the law.133 That this criti-
cism is well founded is evident in the restrictions placed upon
legislative action under the divisions, police power, labor regula-
tions, control of public utilities, and attempted limitations of
property and personal rights for the social welfare by such con-
cepts as reasonableness, equal protection, implied limitations on
legislative power, liberty of contract, and fundamental rights.
Too frequently, indeed, courts, armed with a conception of nat-
ural and inalienable rights regarded as absolute and with express
provisions of a general nature in constitutions, have acted on the
theory that the affirmative powers of a government erected for
the protection of a free people should be few and that the
regulations and prohibitions should be many. 3 4
At the same time that natural law is receiving judicial sanction
in the United States the idea has been undergoing a revival in
European countries. While natural law has always been rather
significant in Europe, particularly in countries like France vhere
the philosophic jurists are dominant, it has recently been accorded
even greater significance. On the theory that positive law is
regarded as the rules formulated by a lawmaker and sanctioned
by an external authority, rational law is conceived as "rules
which, in the eyes of reason, ought to be sanctioned by an exter-
nal restraint."' 35  The idea of natural law, according to a mod-
" Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 American Law Review,
28. See a criticism of the natural law of the practicing lawyer, examples
of which abound in our judicial decisions, and the juristic theories have
been more barren than the eighteenth century natural law of American
judges in the nineteenth century, 24 Harvard Law Review, 6og, 611; Cf.
also Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327.
'" Cf. Pound, Enforcement of Law, Proceedings of the Illinois State
Bar Association, i9o8; also Puritanism and the Common Law, 45
American Law Review, 811.
"'Cf. Dean, The Law of the Land, 48 American Law Review, 66o.
See, People v'. Coler, 166 N. Y. I, 14, for the observation: "It is proper
for courts to keep in mind in expounding the constitution the maxim that
that government governs best which governs least."
"Boistel, Cours de philosophie du droit, secs. 1, 2. Cf. Berolzheimer,
p. 321.
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em exponent, is conceived differently from what it was formerly.
"It is reconciled with the idea of evolution and with the idea of
utility. It loses its absolute and immovable character. It has
only a variable content. It takes account of the interdependence
of the individual and the whole. It tends also to reconcile the
individual conscience and the law."136  This new natural law
sanctions only such laws as are theoretically just under existing
conditions. It becomes, as has been aptly termed, "a natural law
with a variable content."'137
The old natural law was assumed to be made up of principles
to which the positive law must of necessity conform. The new
natural law results in a search foi a body of rules governing
legal development in accordance with the prevailing economic,
social and political conditions. To the sociological jurist who
regards legal rules merely as a general guide to the judge and
who insists that the judge should be free to deal with individual
cases in such a way as to meet the demand of justice between
the parties the law of nature and of reason becomes important.
Under the influence of both the philosophical and sociological
jurists it appears destined to an even more eventful career than
in the past. 38
The quest of jurists and judges for principles of justice, to
which they seek to make the rules enforced in tribunals approxi-
mate so far as possible, is manifestly one of the determining
influences in the evolution of law as well as in its modern appli-
" Charmont, La renaissance du droit naturel, 122-127. Pound, Scope
and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 Harvard Law Review, 492.
On the distinction between the old natural law philosophy and the .modern
philosophy of the law, cf., Berolzheimer, System der Rechts und Wirt-
schaftsphilosophie II, Sec. 4, Rechtsphilosophie und Naturrecht.
.. Berolzheimer, Intr., p. xiv, quoting Stammler, Die Lehre von dem
Richtigen Rechte, p. 137.
" Pound, 25 Harvard Law Review, 515: "It is not an accident," says
Dean Pound, "that something like a resurrection of natural law is
going on the world over," 25 Harvard Law Review, 162. For sanction
of the principle that when judges do not find the rules of law sufficient
for the settlement of controversy they may decide "according to the
principles of natural law" consult Austrian Civil Code, Int. Secs. 6-8
and Italian Civil Code, Sec. 3. A similar practice to the effect that judges
may be guided by the "rules of equity which exist in the maxims of
natural law, universal justice and reason" seems to be sanctioned by the
interpretation placed upon Article 5, of the French Civil Code, and the
general functions of the judge as commonly understood in France.
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cation in Europe and America. The great characteristic of the
principles of civil .and criminal justice is acknowledged to be
that they do not appear as the dictates of government, but as
the dictates of reason.1 30 Natural law is, to be sure, nothing
more than the individual judge's or jurist's conception of what
ought to be law, and often it involves preconceived notions of
right and justice to which positive laws are made to conform.140
The law of nature has been styled an "appeal from Caesar to a
better informed Caesar," and as an appeal by society at large,
or by the best spirits of a given society, against single decisions or
against the -entire system of positive law. 1 " As an application
of individual judge's and jurist's ideas of right and morality in
advance of those which have been enacted into formal positive
law, it cannot but be a leavening process in any legal system.
When the adjustment of formal law to meet new conditions of
ethics and morality is peculiarly difficult, it is all the more neces-
sary to grant the judges the privilege of following rules of
nature and reason so as to accord substantial justice even though
not always in harmony with the strict letter of the law.
If the contention be true that law in its essence is nothing more
nor less than reason and common sense as applied to human
relations, and if, as is generally conceded, the enactments of
positive law and judicial decisions, crystallized into formal prece-
dents, lag behind man's development along moral, social and
economic lines, then it is very necessary indeed that the judges
be accorded the privilege of applying the saving grace of reason,
under whatever cloak, to square the law with the more advanced
precepts of morality, ethics and justice. In the United States,
where analytical jurisprudence is powerful, where statutory law is
voluminous and where judicial decisions are followed as binding
precedents, it is preEminently necessary that the doctrine'of
reason find acceptance and ready application in order that law
may be speedily adjusted to meet the rapidly developing social
and industrial needs. To be sure, the legislature is the body that
is primarily expected to make such adjustments and the courts
'Freund, Police Power, p. 5.
" Natural right is "an ambiguous way of saying what might be less
ambiguously expressed by a direct use of the term 'ought,"' Ritchie,
Natural Rights, p. 75.
"' Cf. Vinogradoff, Common Sense in Law, Chap. IX, The Law of
Nature.
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can do nothing more than fill the gaps and guide the legislative
process. In the guiding process whereby the old law of nature
of the past has been absorbed in due process it is certain that
the courts will take a prominent part in directing the development
of the law. It is also evident that if nature and reason are to be
used as standards to judge many varieties of legislation, it cannot
continue to be an absolute standard based on eternal and immuta-
ble principles of any past age which are held as barriers to the
beneficence and wisdom of the legislature in an effort to ameliorate
social wrongs, but will rather become a nature and reason with
changing content, varying in significance and scope to meet the
rapid modifications in political, social and industrial affairs and
designed to render more equitable and just the application to
concrete cases of the formal provisions of statutes and
constitutions.
CHAPLES GRoVE HAINES.
UNV£5sITY or TEXAS.
